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Abstract 
Welfare concerns what matters to animals from their point of view. What matters to animals 
is their state of need. Satisfaction and frustration of needs are associated with emotional 
states, the subjective experience of which directly determines the welfare status of an ani­
mal. Because emotional states are difficult to assess, overall welfare assessment (OWA) is 
best approached as an assessment of needs. 
For actual OW A a list of needs must be formulated. Different authors have formulated dif­
ferent lists. From these lists a concept need-list was constructed. For validation the needs­
based approach for OWA was discussed in interviews with experts (n = 21) in the field of 
ethology and other welfare related sciences. These experts generally used mental terminolo­
gy to define welfare, but when asked to classify their definition of welfare, many preferred a 
definition in terms of measurable parameters or a combination of both mental terms (feel­
ings) and measurables. Most experts believed that welfare can be assessed objectively and 
that the problem of OW A is indeed best approached through an assessment of needs. Experts 
differ as to the exact composition of the list of needs. A list of needs is formulated which we 
intend to use for OW A in the case of sows. 
Keywords: interviews, expert, animal welfare assessment model, pigs. 
Introduction 
This paper is the third and last of a series on the topic of overall farm-animal welfare 
assessment (OWA). These papers highlight three areas of concern. 
The first paper (Bracke et al., Part 1) dealt with the methodological question 
whether OWA is possible in principle. We defined welfare as what matters to ani­
mals from their point of view. This means that the welfare status of an animal is fully 
determined by the quality of its emotional states, including their sign (positive or 
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negative), intensity and duration. A major problem is how the private minds of ani­
mals can be assessed by scientific methods (Nagel, 1974; Dawkins, 1993, 1998; 
Mason & Mendl, 1993). We suggested to regard OWA as the attempt to make the 
best possible assessment based on what is known scientifically. Accordingly, OWA 
is conceived as the descriptive activity that involves multi-criteria decision making 
with fuzzy information. Based on these considerations we believe that OWA is pos­
sible, but the question remains how it should be done in a systematic and explicit 
way. 
The second paper (Bracke et al., Part 2) reviewed assessment tables and schemes 
that have been published to find useful recommendations as to how OWA may be 
performed. The basic format for OWA was identified as a table in which housing 
systems (in columns) are compared and evaluated using a list of criteria (welfare rel­
evant attributes, in rows). This assessment table must be linked with other (support­
ing) tables to make OWA fully explicit. 
The present paper deals with the problem of how OWA can be performed on a sci­
entific basis. The suggestion is that overall welfare can be assessed from an assess­
ment of needs. We have applied this idea and constructed a prototype decision sup­
port system, which is a computer-based information system that was designed to ex­
amine the feasibility of performing OWA in a systematic way (Bracke et al., 1999). 
Because performing OWA on the basis of an assessment of needs is a very basic as­
sumption, we conducted interviews to examine the degree of consensus for this as­
sumption. The results of these interviews will be presented in this paper. The aims of 
this paper are to specify how overall welfare assessment (OWA) can be performed on 
the basis of biological needs, to examine the degree of consensus among experts for 
such a needs-based approach and to specify a list of needs that may be used for actu­
al OWA in pigs. 
A biological basis for welfare 
Biological organisms are regulated by homeostatic control mechanisms which sup­
port survival and reproduction in the environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA). 
The higher vertebrates are goal-directed (Toates, 1986). They have a number of more 
or less distinct motivational systems. These systems, which we call needs, can be 
thought of as intervening variables which have functionally related sets of behav­
iours or physiological responses that can be activated by a certain class of stimuli 
and deactivated by a specific event or behaviour. Classical examples of motivational 
systems are hunger, thirst, sex and thermoregulation. Each motivational system 
serves a proximate goal (reference point, set point or Sollwert). These goals have 
been formed in the course of evolution and are, therefore, strongly similar for indi­
viduals of the same species (Wiepkema, 1987). In order for responses to be function­
al in achieving the goal the animal surveys its environment and compares Sollwert 
(the goal) and Istwert (the actual state of the world). Discrepancies between Istwert 
and Sollwert cause activation of behavioural and physiological responses with the 
aim of reducing the discrepancy and restoring homeostasis. The degree of the dis-
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crepancy may vary (i.e. the animal may be more or less hungry, thirsty etc.), and 
changes in this 'central motivational state' (Toates, 1986), which we call 'state of 
need', give rise to observable changes in behaviour and physiology ( e.g. when more 
hungry the animal may run faster toward food). 
Higher vertebrates show certain flexibility in the way they achieve their goals, i.e. 
they can take different courses of action to obtain a certain goal. This flexibility also 
requires that animals must monitor the effectiveness of their responses. Emotions, 
such as pleasure and fear, are functional elements in this monitoring process, in that 
they strengthen (when positive) or weaken (when negative) the use of a particular be­
havioural or physiological response (Fraser & Duncan, 1998). Emotions are causally 
related to behaviour ( e.g. Dawkins, 1993; Broom, 1998). They function as signals in 
the brain to coordinate the responsiveness in a certain direction. These signals pro­
duce a coordinated state which is generally appropriate for coping with categories of 
challenges (e.g. danger). Such a state is recognised by the animal. For example, the 
higher vertebrates are able to recognise these internal emotional states as is shown 
by their ability for so-called drug-discrimination learning, which is a much used 
technique to investigate the subjective effects of drugs on the control of behaviour 
(Overton, 1991 ). 
Positive reward occurs in cases where discrepancies between Istwert and Sollwert 
are reduced or minimised. Animals are attracted to objects and events associated 
with positive reward (positive emotions). Events or stimuli that are rewarding act as 
reinforcers, in the sense that they tend to strengthen a response. Conversely, negative 
emotions (aversions) occur when discrepancies between Istwert and Sollwert in­
crease in magnitude or continue to exist. Animals will attempt to avoid such situa­
tions, which they find aversive. Especially negative is stress, i.e. '(a) a protracted 
failure of the animal to maintain alignment between its reference values and the ac­
tual state of the world and (b) the absence of an assessment of near-future realign­
ment' (Toates, 1995, p. 31). 
Because animals have different needs and because they often cannot serve differ­
ent goals at the same time, animals also have regulatory mechanisms to solve cases 
of conflict between them. For example, an animal may have to choose between food 
and escape from danger. Animals are generally very well able to make 'decisions' 
among different possible courses of action. Such decisions involve a cost-benefit 
evaluation, which requires a common currency (McFarland, 1989). Most likely, this 
common currency is the rewarding value that represents the expected benefits of 
each alternative course of action. In this model, animals, like humans, are supposed 
to act so as to maximise positive affective states and minimised negative ones. They 
maximise reward (Cabanac, 1971 ). This implies that animals themselves assess their 
different states of need and this overall assessment constitutes their welfare. 
OWA based on needs 
From the argument above it follows that for overall welfare assessment (OWA) the 
various states of need of an animal must be assessed and integrated as much as pos-
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sible in the way the animals themselves perform the assessment. Below, we will 
specify the concept of 'needs' further. 
An important distinction is between instrumental and intrinsic relevance. Instru­
mentally relevant are those aspects that are a means to the end of OWA; i.e. they are 
relevant because they give information about other aspects which are more intrinsi­
cally relevant. Intrinsic aspects are ends in themselves. For example, straw is instru­
mental for pig welfare, because it provides substrate to root. Rooting is intrinsically 
relevant when rooting is itself rewarding. Rooting would be instrumentally relevant 
if it were only a means to an end, e.g. a means to obtain food. In the latter case straw 
could be regarded as intrinsically relevant if it had a dietary value for pigs. The pri­
mary task for OWA is to determine what is intrinsically relevant for welfare and how 
these are affected by other aspects in an instrumental way. 
Intrinsically relevant for welfare are all and only the emotional states of animals 
(Bracke et al., Part I). However, it is difficult to assess the sign (positive or nega­
tive), intensity and duration of all emotional states separately. More suitable for an 
objective assessment of welfare is the assessment of needs. If emotions represent a 
state of the organism which has a biological function for a particular need, that state 
must be accessible for measurement and this indirectly reveals an aspect of the sub­
jective state of the animal. For operationalisation of OWA we postulate a (positive) 
( cor)relation between biological functioning and subjective welfare. This postulate 
receives general support in the scientific literature ( e.g. Broom, 1998; Duncan, 
1993; see also Fraser et al., 1997), but exceptions (which we will discuss below) 
have also been recognised. Under the assumption that the state of need is a direct re­
flection of how animals subjectively experience this state emotionally, we may re­
gard needs as intrinsically relevant in the assessment of welfare. They can be as­
sessed objectively and this provides the scientific basis for OWA. 
It follows that only proximate needs are intrinsically relevant for welfare. Welfare 
concerns the proximate causation of behaviour, rather than its ultimate function. Ul­
timate goals such as survival and reproduction have shaped proximate needs in the 
course of evolution, but survival and reproduction per se do not matter to animals 
from their point of view (Duncan & Petherick, 1991 ). For example, what matters to a 
female animal in oestrus is a proximate need to mate, rather than the ultimate goal of 
fertilisation. Because our concept of needs for OWA is closely linked to emotional 
states, it is very similar to, but more general than, animal 'wants' (cf. Duncan & 
Petherick, 1991; Duncan, 1996). It is also similar to Rollin's concept of Telos ( e.g. 
Rollin, 1990), when conceived as the genetically and environmentally constrained 
nature of animals, 'from which flow certain interests and needs, whose fulfilment 
matter to the animal' (p. 203). For the same reason, our concept of needs differs 
from the concept of needs as suggested by Hurnik and collaborators (Hurnik & 
Lehman, 1985, 1988; Hurnik, 1993). For example, longevity may be instrumental in 
OWA, but it is not intrinsically relevant, because animals do not have the concepts of 
life and death (Webster, 1995, p. 15). 
Motivational systems are complex systems. For example, reaching satiety is regu­
lated by various internal and external feedback signals, including the energetic value 
of the food as well as oropharyngeal signals associated with palatability, chewing 
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and swallowing. Needs, such as the need for food, can be often be decomposed fur­
ther into component set-points. As a result, OWA can be regarded at a conceptual 
level ( cf. Stafleu et al., 1996), as a hierarchical assessment: welfare can be decom­
posed into a set of needs which can be decomposed further into component set-point 
states, from which welfare can be assessed. 
In the literature general consensus exists that an aggregate of several different 
measures should be used to assess welfare ( e.g. Broom & Johnson, 1993 ). In fact 
many attributes (characteristics, aspects) of housing and management affect the wel­
fare status of farm animals. In order to specify how these attributes affect welfare, a 
needs-based approach seems the most appropriate ( cf. also Dawkins, 1998). It offers 
an organising principle and provides a way to check whether the list of welfare rele­
vant attributes is complete. In addition, a risk in OWA is that one component is taken 
for the whole (Rushen, 1991 ). The single most important reason to use a needs­
based approach for OWA is that it supports assessment of welfare overall: it helps to 
identify welfare problems (frustrated needs) and it helps to identify gaps in our sci­
entific knowledge (to assess the state of need properly). 
Scientific paradigms 
An assessment of the state of need includes an assessment of the degree of positive 
and negative reward, the animal's motivational strength to obtain those rewards and 
the duration of the relevant emotional states. Each need state can be assessed on a 
scale that ranges from maximum frustration to maximum satisfaction of that need. 
To assess these needs we must use information about environmental conditions, and 
empirical information from ethology and physiology (including production and 
patho-physiology). These can be regarded as different perspectives that provide rele­
vant information to assess a state of need. In addition a subjective, psychological 
perspective can also be identified that specifies the nature of the emotional states. 
The psychological perspective and the various perspectives constituted by the empir­
ical sciences are different perspectives on the same phenomenon, the state of need. 
The problem of OWA is to show how welfare, as defined from this psychological 
perspective at the conceptual level, can be assessed at the explanatory and opera­
tional levels (see Stafleu et al., 1996) while using only empirical information. We 
suggest that the various scientific paradigms allow the formulation of assessment 
rules that can be used for this purpose. 
Scientific measures relevant for OWA include feral data, preference tests (time 
budgets and choice experiments), operant techniques (including demand curves), 
measures of aversion and suffering, measures of the consequences of deprivation on 
behaviour, stress-physiology, pathology and production. These measures indicate 
what animals normally, naturally or experimentally are inclined to approach or avoid, 
how important their preferences are to them and how well animals are able to adapt 
or cope. Problems exist with the interpretation of all measures (Rushen, 1991; Ma­
son & Mend!, 1993; Dawkins, 1998). For example, feral data may be criticised in 
that nature may be romantic but cruel (Dawkins, 1980); what animals chose may not 
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always be what is best for their health (Duncan & Dawkins, 1983); and coping ani­
mals may still be suffering (Mendl, 1991 ). Problems of interpretation have been con­
sidered difficult to resolve. However, such problems typically involve cases where 
different scientific paradigms are in conflict with each other with respect to OWA. 
We suggest taking a consensus-oriented approach for OWA. Despite the fact that 
much remains to be discovered, much knowledge that is relevant for OWA has been 
collected over the last decades. OWA concerns the attempt to make the best possible 
assessment based on the knowledge that is available (Bracke et al., Part 1). We be­
lieve the available knowledge is sufficient to allow a reasonably accurate assess­
ment. Similarly, despite difficulties in the interpretation of all scientific paradigms, 
each paradigm can be expected to capture at least part of the truth. This allows the 
formulation of assessment rules in relation to each paradigm. Every assessment rule 
includes a 'prima facie' clause indicating that the rule is valid for the most part and 
other things being equal. For example, prima facie, the more natural the behaviour, 
the better welfare ( e.g. Wemelsfelder, 1997). Similarly for the other paradigms in­
cluding predictability and controllability (Wiepkema, 1982, 1987; Wiepkema & 
Koolhaas, 1993 ), fitness ( e.g. Fraser & Broom, 1990) and consumer demand theory 
(Dawkins, 1983). 
However, from the conclusion above that OWA should be in accordance with wel­
fare assessment as performed by the animals themselves it follows that of all scien­
tific paradigms the study of preferences of animals takes a special place. For OWA 
we must answer the questions 'what do animals want, i.e. what do they find reward­
ing and/or aversive?' and 'How important is the satisfaction of these wants or needs 
for them?'. Other scientific paradigms, e.g. studies of natural behaviour or stress­
physiology have a more supportive function in that they provide additional informa­
tion about proximate needs. 
For every 'prima facie' assessment rule we also expect to find exceptions, which 
become evident when rules conflict. For example, the argument that nature may also 
be cruel constitutes a conflict between one rule that says that natural conditions indi­
cate good welfare, and the second rule that says that disease indicates poor welfare. 
Nature is cruel when it subjects animals to disease. Such a conflict between assess­
ment rules can be resolved when, in accordance with our definition of welfare, the 
primacy of the animal's emotional states is recognised: nature is good provided the 
animal doesn't experience poor health. Further specifications can be expected. For 
example, poor health indicates poor welfare, but an abdominal tumour may not be 
associated with negative emotional states. If so, again, the assessment rule should be 
refined. This revision of assessment rules into more and more specific rules may be­
come very complicated and difficult. At some point we may have to stop formulating 
more and more specific rules. At such a point, these rules can be used as heuristic 
rules for OWA. As heuristic rules they will allow a most reasonable assessment of 
welfare despite the fact that some assessment errors will inevitably be made. Since 
large numbers of attributes are involved in OWA the use of heuristic rules may be the 
most rational approach to OWA until further research can provide a more complete 
set of specific assessment rules. 
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Types of needs 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to specify the different set points of animals, also 
because they tend to be very (species, age, sex) specific. However, we will attempt to 
specify which needs farm animals have. 
Animals have many control systems that are designed to obtain or maintain a cer­
tain (local) goal or set point. Not all control systems are equally relevant for welfare, 
because they are not all equally associated with emotional states. Emotional states 
especially arise when the attention of the whole animal and a close monitoring of the 
efficiency of responses is required. We will call needs associated with such systems 
'cognitive'. Other systems are more under autonomic regulation. Examples include 
many processes at cellular and tissue level, but also the immune system, the regula­
tion of heart rate and respiration. These autonomic systems are either largely inter­
nally organised or only use rather stable environmental factors (such as oxygen). 
They don't require additional emotional states for normal regulation. However, when 
autonomic regulation fails, emotional states do occur even in these systems, e.g. by 
general symptoms of fatigue or illness. It follows that for welfare both types of con­
trol are relevant, but they are not relevant to the same degree. The tolerance for devi­
ations between actual state (Istwert) and set point (Sollwert) is generally much lower 
where emotional states are involved which deal with (more fluctuating) environmen­
tal events. It is those needs that have an association with emotional states that are es­
pecially relevant and functional for welfare. However, although some needs are more 
important than other needs, they cannot be classified into necessities and luxuries, 
because their importance ranges over a continuum and because their relative impor­
tance may vary according to the circumstances. 
Needs can also be classified into appetitive ( e.g. hunger, thirst, sex) and aversive 
systems ( e.g. fear and aggression) ( cf. Toates, 1986). Appetitive needs have a special 
subclass of needs: the ethological needs. Ethological needs are those needs where 
the performance of behaviour is intrinsically rewarding, rather than, or in addition 
to, the attainment of some functional end-point that is normally associated with the 
performance of that behaviour. For example, rooting of pigs is itself rewarding, even 
when the normal consequences associated with this behaviour, i.e. food, is provided 
ad lib. Ethological needs concern activities that are essential in the environment of 
evolutionary adaptation (EEA). They are regulated by being positively rewarding, 
for example because the ultimate goal is beyond the cognitive capacities of the ani­
mal or because it would be disadvantageous to stop the behaviour in the absence of 
immediate functional consequences. According to Toates (1995) it is now generally 
accepted that animals indeed are motivated to perform certain species-specific be­
haviours (however see also Baxter 1983) and that reward value is associated with the 
ability to perform these behaviours. 
The above distinctions (appetitive-aversive, cognitive-autonomic and ethological) 
result in the following classification of needs. Appetitive cognitive needs include 
food, water, sex, rest and social contact. This class shows overlap with appetitive 
ethological needs such as exploration, play and body care related needs. Appetitive 
autonomic needs include thermoregulation and respiration. Aversive autonomic 
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needs include health and no injury. Fear is an aversive cognitive need. This classifi­
cation is tentative and provides an ordering principle, rather than an absolute classi­
fication. 
Needs have also been classified into those needs that are largely internally moti­
vated (e.g. food, water, ethological needs) and those that are largely externally moti­
vated ( e.g. aggression, predator avoidance). However, it is now generally recognised 
that all needs have both internal and external factors. Like the internal-external dis­
tinction the distinctions we use in our classification (appetitive-aversive; cognitive­
autonomic; ethological) do not create mutually exclusive categories, but are differ­
ences that vary over a continuum and often (if not always) include elements of both 
extremes. Even within needs some elements may fit in one class, while other ele­
ments fit better in another class. For example, vasoconstriction and vasodilatation as 
part of thermoregulation are under autonomic control while nestbuilding, which is 
also part of thermoregulation, may be an ethological need. Although our classifica­
tion is only tentative, we will use it as stepping stones that should not obstruct flexi­
bility in the assessment procedure. 
Interviews with experts 
In order to perform actual OWA we have built a prototype welfare-model for pigs 
(more specifically for pregnant sows; Bracke et al., 1999). In this model we assessed 
overall welfare using a list of needs. To explore the degree of consensus for this 
model 21  experts from 8 different countries were interviewed about their concept of 
welfare and about needs. Together 11 Dutch experts, 9 experts from other European 
countries and one North-American expert were included with expertise in the fields 
of general farm animal welfare, fundamental ethology, physiology, veterinary sci­
ence and experimental psychology (fields listed in the order of importance). All ex­
perts were scientists. 
Issues that specifically concern weighting of welfare components were explicitly 
excluded from these interviews, because our aim was to explore the degree of con­
sensus for the assumption that logically precedes weighting, namely using needs for 
OWA. We wanted to know whether our concept of welfare was in accordance with 
expert opinion, and whether OWA may be performed as a function of need states. 
Three questions were asked about the concept of welfare and two questions were 
asked about needs. 
I .  How do you define welfare? 
2. What type of welfare definition do you favour, in terms of measurable parameters 
or in terms of feelings? 
3. Can welfare be assessed objectively? 
4. What are the components of welfare and what is your opinion about the prototype 
need-list (which was presented to the expert, cf. Table 1)? 
5. Do you believe OWA based on an assessment of needs is the proper way to pro­
ceed? 
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In response to the first question relatively few experts cite definitions from the liter­
ature: five experts cited three definitions. A common characteristic of the defini­
tions as stated by the experts is that they all make reference to biological function­
ing. Furthermore, the importance of subj ective feelings showed as follows: 18 out of 
21 experts used mental terminology, 2 experts refused to give a definition of welfare 
and only 1 expert completely refrained from using mentalistic terminology in his 
first stated definition. However, when asked what type of definition was preferred 
( question 2), 9 experts favoured a definition in terms of measurable parameters over 
subjective feelings; 8 experts preferred a combination of both feelings and measur­
able parameters, and only 4 experts favoured feelings. 18 Experts answered that wel­
fare can be measured at least in part objectively, while 3 experts stated that welfare 
cannot be measured objectively (question 3). This suggests that, while subjective 
feelings are considered important for welfare conceptually, scientists, as a group, be­
lieve welfare can be assessed objectively. 
The components of welfare were discussed with the help of the prototype list of 
needs as specified in the first column of Table 1. The interviewer explained that this 
list was not intended as a hierarchical ordering of behavioural elements, but that its 
function was to ' break down' the complex problem of welfare into manageable 
chunks which could support OWA. This implies that each component in the list must 
be necessary for assessing welfare overall . For example, health, food, water, and 
thermocomfort are not the only needs, because there may be a social welfare prob­
lem. So, this social component must be added to the list, etc. 
Responses to this list were diverse. It was said to be a standard list, but, when 
asked further several remarks were obtained. One remark was that the list was not 
uniform in that it puts incompatible terms on the same level, such as health, mental 
terms (e.g. 'no fear', 'no pain ' )  and behavioural systems. A common denominator 
would be preferable. Furthermore, the concept of a hierarchy of needs was chal­
lenged on the grounds that components will overlap and that every hierarchy is nec­
essarily artificial. Furthermore, experts differed with respect to the classification of 
needs and their definition. For example, some experts classified rooting as part of 
the need for food, but other experts classified it as a separate need. While several ex­
perts identified the need for stimulation as a separate need that refers to environmen­
tal complexity and novelty, the frustration of which can be expressed as apathy (as in 
Wemelsfelder, 1993), other experts argued that the need for stimulation reduces to 
other needs, such as exploration, locomotion and social contact. Despite these differ­
ences a consensus area could also be identified. For example, all experts included 
the needs for food, water, rest, social contact and thermocomfort. 
At the end of the interview we asked the expert to state his/her opinion about the 
suggestion to assess overall welfare as a function of need states (question 6). Most 
experts ( 17 out of 21) had a positive attitude toward this suggestion; 2 experts 
showed a neutral atti tude, saying that it may be possible to do so, and 2 experts tend­
ed to be negative about this approach. 
With respect to expert opinion about needs, we conclude that, although not with­
out difficulties and opportunities for further improvement, broad consensus exists 
for a scientific approach to OWA based on needs. 

























Table I .  Overview of need lists for welfare assessment (Author, publication year, focal species and focal attention). The lists are ordered hierarchically 
in two levels. The first-level items are stated in bold. As much as possible, corresponding terms have been put on the same row. '-' indicates that an as­
pect, which is found iil other lists, appears to be missing in the present list. Dotted lines indicate clusters of needs, namely appetitive cognitive, appeti­
tive ethological, appetitive autonomic, aversive autonomic and aversive cognitive needs (see text). 
Bracke et al Bracke et al Fraser Baxter & Baxter Schlichting & Smidt 
Prototype list Revised list 1983 1984 1989 
Pigs Pigs Pigs, sheep, cattle Pigs Pigs 
Needs Needs Maintenance Needs Behaviour systems 
Ingestion Ingestion Ingestion 
Food Food Feed Hunger Feed 
Water Water Drink Thirst Drink 
Rest Rest Rest Sleep Rest 
Social contact Social contact Association Sociality Social 
Reproduction Reproduction 
Sexual Sexual Sex Sexual 
Nest building Nest building Nest building 












































































No pain ________________ No injury ----········-·-··-·-·--·-·-·-··-·-·······--·---·-·····-··-·---··--·----·-·-··-···········-------·-·-·--·-···-·---··-·-·--···---·-···········-·--·--·-·-----·----·--·-·-
N o fear Safety Reactivity Predictability and Fight/flight Self-protection 
No danger controllability 
No aggression 
1 Fraser ( 1 983) includes locomotion, play and stretching into 'Kinesis' . 
2 Fraser ( 1 983) includes individual space, home range and feeding rang into 'Territorialism' .  
3 Taylor et al . ,  ( 1 995) include hierarchy formation, allelomimetic behaviour, peer bonding, reproductive and maternal behaviour in the social mainte-
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List of needs 
For the purpose of actual OWA it is necessary to have a specified list of needs. Table 
1 shows various lists of needs (Fraser, 1983; Baxter & Baxter, 1984; Schlichting & 
Smidt, 1989; Sundrum et al., 1994; Taylor et al., 1995) .  This table shows clear dif­
ferences between authors. Most often ' left out' are items concerning respiration, ter­
ritorialism, health and items related to reproduction. In addition, the hierarchical or­
ganisation differs; e.g. play is part of kines is for Fraser ( 1983) and part of explo­
ration for Schlichting & Smidt (1989). Furthermore, different terms are used to de­
note overlapping concepts, for example 'body care' and 'comfort' . Conversely, simi­
lar terms may be used for partly diverging concepts. For example, Fraser's list con­
tains territorialism, which includes various aspects of space, namely individual 
space, home range and feeding range. Others do not include territorialism in their 
list, but have incorporated these aspects into other components such as social con­
tact, locomotion and ingestion. These differences illustrate the importance of stan­
dardisation and unifying definitions in the field of OWA. However, maybe even 
more important for OWA is that Table 1 also identifies underlying consensus. It con­
firms that these authors believe needs are important constituents of welfare and that 
the list of needs for OWA includes ingestion (food and water), thermoregulation, 
rest, social contact, kinesis, exploration and body care/comfort. In addition to these 
needs, needs related to fear/avoidance and sex are also well established (Toates, 
1986). 
We made some minor revisions in our prototype list of needs for actual OWA in 
the case of pigs (see Table l ) .  The revised list does no longer contain the subjective 
terms ' no fear' and ' no pain' . As a common denominator we have chosen motiva­
tional systems. Although further revision may prove necessary, this list provides the 
starting point for development of a tool to assess the overall welfare-status of pigs. It 
contains the elements that we believe to be necessary to assess the overall welfare 
status of pigs. 
The revised l is t  includes the following needs: ingestion (incl uding the need for 
food and water), rest, social contact, reproduction-related needs (sex, nest building 
and maternal care), kinesis, exploration (including exploration of novelty, foraging 
and play), body care, evacuation, territorialism, thermocomfort, respiration, health 
(including no injuries or pain) and safety (including ' no danger' and ' no aggres­
sion'). 
Specific for pigs are behavioural elements such as rooting, nest building, wallow­
ing and the ability to separate the resting from the elimination area. For application 
to other species or to specific subgroups (e.g. pregnant sows or growing pigs) espe­
cially ·the ethological needs require modification. Below, we will discuss the needs 
that are relevant for welfare assessment in pregnant sows. 
Body-care concerns the behavioural elements of scratching (grooming) and wal­
lowing in pigs. Evacuation concerns the eliminative behaviour that is specific to 
pigs, namely to separate the resting area from the elimination areas, and, possibly, to 
mark the home range. 
The need to explore concerns the active behavioural processes by which an animal 
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assimilates information about its environment. Exploration is especially evoked by 
mild disparity between sensory input and stored representations or expectations. (A 
larger disparity results in fear and avoidance, which we have classified under ' safe­
ty' .) Two major components of exploration are the need to explore novelty and the 
need to forage (rooting in pigs). Foraging is appetitive feeding behaviour. As such it 
could be argued to be part of the need for food. However, scientific data concerning 
contrafreeloading, where animals have been shown to work for food even when ad 
lib food is available, support a classification of foraging as a separate need. Since re­
cent evidence suggests that foraging may be part of the need to explore or to gather 
information (Bean et al., 1998), we have classified rooting as part of the need to ex­
plore. Play has also been subsumed under exploration, because a main function of 
play involves learning. 
The need to move, kinesis, may not be controlled by a separate control system. In­
stead it may be argued that it is part of various other needs, e.g. exploration. Howev­
er, since there seems universal consensus that space and the ability to move are im­
portant components of welfare, we incorporate the need for kinesis as a separate 
functional element in the need list. 
In line with other authors we include respiration as a separate need (cf. Table I ) . 
Baxter & Baxter ( 1984) defined respiration as the need ' to prevent the sow feeling 
asphyxiated or choked' (p. 283). This need has its own control centre in the brain 
and accordingly may classify as a separate need. However, it may also be subsumed 
under ' safety' or under ' health' as noxious stimuli (e.g. NH3, CO2, H2S, dust lev­
els) , because it is probably largely under autonomic control, meaning that only gross 
deviations are relevant for welfare. 
The need for health is the need to be free from disease, i.e. the absence of clinical 
symptoms or pathological anatomical abnormalities. It is included as a separate need 
because it is related to a semi-behavioural system, namely ' sickness behaviour' 
(Hart, 1988). Health is clearly associated with welfare relevant emotional states. In 
addition, when activated, sickness behaviour must clearly compete for time and mo­
tor output with other behaviour systems such as feeding, sex or the avoidance of dan­
ger. Often sickness behaviour takes priority indicating that combating the disease is 
important for the animal (and its welfare) . Like other motivational systems sickness 
behaviour is functional for survival (Hart, 1988). It also involves learning processes. 
Examples of such learning include food aversion learning, self-narcosization to alle­
viate pain and so-called antidotal thirst to alleviate sickness (reviewed in Toates, 
1986, e.g. p. 76). 
The need for health includes specific illnesses and inj uries. The injury sub-com­
ponent captures the ' no pain' item in the prototype list. Pain and fear are related mo­
tivational systems, but ' whereas the fear system is responsible for motivating escape 
from a dangerous location, the pain motivational system determines the behaviour of 
resting to allow recuperation.' (Toates, 1 986, p. 1 54 ). 
The fear system has been renamed as the need for safety. This need is associated 
with the flight/fight/fright syndrome that serves to maintain the integrity of the 
whole body against potential disturbance and damage. It does not imply that the goal 
is absolutely no fear. Exposure to mild or moderate fear is even thought to be benefi-
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cial (Jones, 1997). It seems to be a feature of various types of environmental stimuli 
that too much as well as too little stimulation may be suboptimal for need satisfac­
tion (Fraser et al., 1975, p. 655). Other examples of this phenomenon include tem­
perature, food and social contact. The terms ' safety' and 'fear' are used here to de­
note only one component of welfare. In a wider sense, where safety would include 
aspects of health, ingestion, thermoregulation, etc., it could be interpreted to cover 
(almost) the entire field of welfare. In this paper, safety denotes only one of the 
classes of things that motivate animals. 
Not included in our list for pigs are territorialism, predictability and control, ab­
normal behaviour and stimulation. Territorialism is an ethological need that does not 
apply to pigs because pigs do not defend a territory, although they do live in home 
ranges (Graves, 1984). For pigs we will subsume the aspects that are related to terri­
torialism under other needs such as kinesis and exploration. Abnormal behaviour 
(Schlichting & Smidt, 1989), and predictability and control (Baxter & Baxter, 1984) 
are not separate needs, but seem to be more general indicators of welfare problems. 
Even if the underlying motivational basis is not always well understood (e.g. Rushen 
et al., 1993), they generally subsume under other needs. Similarly, for stimulation 
we prefer to subsume it under the need to explore (novelty). 
As this discussion illustrates, drawing up a list of needs requires making decisions 
about issues that have not been fully resolved. It seems necessary to compare various 
need lists and to examine their practical implications. However, for actual OWA it is 
necessary to have a specified list. By making choices explicit we hope these issues 
will be re-actualised, which in turn may lead to improved welfare assessment. 
Conclusions 
This paper deals with the question how OWA can be performed on a scientific basis. 
We suggested to perform OWA based on an assessment of needs. A needs-based ap­
proach allows welfare to be concerned with what matters from the animal's point of 
view, while at the same time allowing a scientific approach. This is because the term 
' need' has both subjective and objective elements in its meaning. Needs were de­
fined as the states of the animal's motivational systems, which specify the animal's 
proximate goals. The concept of emotional states plays a functional role, both in 
channelling various kinds of input to produce an efficient response (the causation of 
behaviour) as well as in constituting the animal's welfare status. However, emotional 
states do not provide an immediate operational tool for OWA. By contrast, the con­
cept of needs provides a more useful approach to assess welfare. A needs-based ap­
proach provides the stepping stones to organise welfare relevant attributes. It also 
ensures that welfare is assessed overall. 
OWA requires taking into account all available scientific evidence. The various 
scientific paradigms concerned with welfare all provide relevant data. In addition, 
these paradigms may allow the formulation of various assessment rules. These rules 
should be specified as much as possible and apparent conflicts between them should 
be a reason to specify the rules in more detail. At some point these assessment rules 
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may have to be used as heuristic rules for operational OWA. 
Interviews with experts confirmed that feelings are an important element in the 
concept of welfare, but they also confirmed that they believe welfare can be assessed 
objectively and that OWA is probably best performed based on an assessment of 
needs. 
For actual OWA it is necessary to specify a list of needs. A list of needs for pigs 
was formulated. It includes needs in relation to ingestion, rest, social contact, repro­
duction, kinesis, exploration, body-care, evacuation, thermoregulation, respiration, 
health and safety. This list is not final, but it will be used as a starting point to per­
form actual OWA in the case of pregnant sows. 
Acknowledgements 
This work was funded by the Technology Foundation (STW) (through a joint grant 
from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research and the Netherlands Min­
istry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries) and the Dutch Society for 
the Protection of Animals. We thank Dr. Frans Stafleu and Dr. Willem Schouten for 
their comments. 
References 
Baxter, M.R., 1 983. Ethology in environmental design for animal production. Applied Animal Ethology 
9: 207-220. 
Baxter, M.R. & S.H. Baxter, 1 984. How to delineate the sow's welfare needs? Anna/es Recherches Ve­
terinaire 1 5 :  28 1-286. 
Bean, D., G. Mason & M. Bateson, 1 998. Why do animals work for food when food is free? Using star­
lings to test the information hypothesis for contrafreeloading. In: I .  Vessier & A. Boissy (Eds), Pro­
ceedings of the 32nd Congress of the International Society for Applied Ethology. Chaumeil Repro, 
Clermont-Ferrand, p. 1 07. 
Bracke, M.B.M., J.H.M. Metz, A.A. Dijkhuizen & B.M. Spruijt, 1 999. The development of a decision 
support system to assess the welfare status of pregnant sows. In: Th. Wensing (Ed), Production Dis­
eases in Farm Animals: 10th International Conference 1 998. Wageningen Pers, Wageningen, p. 235. 
Bracke, M.B.M., J.H.M. Metz & B.M. Spruijt, Part I . Overall animal welfare assessment reviewed. Part 
1 :  Is it possible? (This journal) 
Bracke, M.B.M., J.H.M. Metz & B.M. Spruijt, Part 2. Overall animal welfare assessment reviewed. Part 
2: Assessment tables and schemes. (This journal) 
Breland, K. & M. Breland, 1 96 1 .  The misbehavior of organisms. American Psychologist 16: 68 1-684. 
Broom, D.M., 1 998. Welfare, stress, and the evolution of feelings. Advances in the Study of Behavior 
27: 37 1-403. 
Broom, D.M. & K.G. Johnson, 1 993. Stress and Animal Welfare. Chapman & Hall, London, 2 1 1  pp. 
Cabanac, M., 1 97 1 .  Physiological role of pleasure. Science I 73 :  1 1 03-1 1 07. 
Dawkins, M.S., 1 980. Animal Suffering: The Science of Animal Welfare. Chapman and Hall, London, 
149 pp. 
Dawkins, M.S., 1 983 .  Battery hens name their price: consumer demand theory and the measurement of 
ethological 'needs ' .  Animal Behaviour 3 1 :  1 1 95-1 205. 
Dawkins, M.S., 1 993. Through our Eyes only. The Search for Animal Consciousness. W.H Freeman and 
Company, Oxford, 1 92 pp. 
Dawkins, M.S., 1 998. Evolution and animal welfare. The Quarterly Review of Biology 73:  305-328. 
320 Netherlands Journal of Agricultural Science 4 7 (1999) 
OVERALL ANIMAL WELFARE ASSESSMENT 3 
Duncan, I .J.H., 1 993. Welfare is to do with what animals feel. Journal of Agricultural and Environmen­
tal Ethics 6, Supplement 2: 8-14 .  
Duncan, I .J.H., 1 996. Animal welfare defined in terms of feelings. Acta Agricultura Scandinavica Sec­
tion A, Animal Science, Supplement 27: 29-35. 
Duncan, I.J.H. & M.S.  Dawkins, 1 983. The problem of assessing "well-being" and "suffering" in farm 
animals. In: D. Smidt (Ed), Indicators relevant to Farm Animal Welfare. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 
pp. 1 2-24. 
Duncan, I.J.H. & J.C. Petherick, 1 99 1 .  The implications of cognitive processes for animal welfare. Jour­
nal of Animal Science 69: 50 1 7-5022. 
Fraser, A.F., 1 983. The behaviour of maintenance and the intensive husbandry of cattle, sheep and pigs. 
Agriculure, Ecosystems and Environonment 9: 1-23. 
Fraser, A.F. & D.M. Broom, 1 990. Farm Animal Behaviour and Welfare, 3,d ed. Bailliere Tindall, Lon­
don, 437 pp. 
Fraser, D. & I.J.H. Duncan, 1 998. 'Pleaures', 'pains'and animal welfare: Towards a natural history of 
affect. Animal Welfare 7:  383-396. 
Fraser, D., J.S.D. Ritchie & A.F. Fraser, 1 975. The term 'stress' in a veterinary context. British Veteri­
nary Journal 1 3  I :  653-662. 
Fraser, D., D.M. Weary, E.A. Pajor & B.N. Milligan, 1 997. A scientific conception of animal welfare 
that reflects ethical concerns. Animal Welfare 6: 1 87-205. 
Graves, H.B., 1 984. Behaviour and ecology of wild and feral swine (Sus Scrofa). Journal of Animal Sci­
ence 58: 482-492. 
Hart, B.L., 1 988. Biological basis of the behavior of sick animals. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Re­
views 12 :  1 23- 1 37. 
Hurnik, J.F., 1993. Ethics and animal agriculture. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 6, 
Supplement 1 :  2 1-35 .  
Hurnik, J .F .  & H. Lehman, 1 985. The philosophy of farm animal welfare: a contribution to the assess­
ment of farm animal well-being. In: R.-M. Wegner (Ed), Second European Symposium on Poultry 
Welfare. German Branch of the World's Poultry Science Association, Celle, pp. 255-266. 
Humik, J.F. & H. Lehman, 1 988. Ethics and farm animal welfare. Journal of Agricultural Ethics I :  
305-3 1 8. 
Jones, R.B., 1 997. Fear and distress. In: M.C. Appleby & B.O. Hughes (Eds), Animal Welfare. CAB In­
ternational, Oxon, pp. 75-87. 
Mason, G. & M. Mend), 1 993. Why is there no simple way of measuring animal welfare? Animal Wel­
fare 2: 301-3 1 9. 
McFarland, D., 1 989. Problems in Animal Behaviour. Longman Scientific & Technical, Longman 
House, Burnt Mill, Harlow, Essex, 1 58  pp. 
Mend), M., 199 1 .  Some problems with the concept of a cut-off point for determining when an animal's 
welfare is at risk. Applied Animal Behaviour Science 3 1 :  1 39- 1 46. 
Nagel, T., 1 974. What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review 83: 435-450. 
Overton, D.A., 1 99 1 .  A historical perspective on drug discrimination. Nida Research Monograph 1 1 6: 5 - 24. 
Rollin, B.E., 1 990. The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and Science. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford, 308 pp. 
Rushen, J., 1 99 1 .  Problems associated with the interpretation of physiological data in the assessment of 
animal welfare. Applied Animal Behaviour Science 28: 38 1-386. 
Rushen, J., A.B. Lawrence & E.M.C. Terlouw, 1 993. The motivational basis of stereotypies. In: A.B. 
Lawrence & J. Rushen (Eds), Stereotypic Animal Behaviour: Fundamentals and Applications to Wel­
fare. CAB International, Wallingford, pp. 4 1-64. 
Schlichting, M. & D. Smidt, I 989. Subkriterium Tierverhalten. In: C. Fuchs, J. Gartung & J. Hoeges 
(Eds), Haltungssysteme fiir Mastschweine. Vergleich, Bewertung, Verbesserungsansatze. KTBL­
Schrift 335 .  KTBL e.V., Darmstadt, pp. 7 1-88 . 
Stafleu, F.R., F.J. Grommers & J. Vorstenbosch, 1 996. Animal welfare: Evolution and erosion of a 
moral concept. Animal Welfare 5: 77-84. 
Sundrum, A., R. Andersson & G. Postier (Eds), 1 994. Der Tiergerechtheitsindex-200/ 1 994 - Ein Leit­
faden zur Beurteilung von Haltungssystemen fiir Rinder, Kalber, Legehennen und Schweine. Verlag 
Kiillen, Bonn, 2 1 1  pp. 
Netherlands Journal of Agricultural Science 47 (1999) 32 1 
M.B.M. BRACKE, B.M. SPRUIJT AND J.H.M. METZ 
Taylor, A.A., J.F. Hurnik & H. Lehman, 1 995 . The aplication of Cost-Benefit Dominance analysis to 
the assessment of farm animal quality of life. Social Indicators Research 35 :  3 1 3-329. 
Toates, F., 1 986. Motivational Systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1 88 pp. 
Toates, F., 1 995. Stress: Conceptual and Biological Aspects. Wiley, New York, 339 pp. 
Webster, J., 1 995. Animal Welfare: A Cool Eye Towards Eden. Blackwell, Oxford, 273 pp. 
Wemelsfelder, F., 1 993. Animal Boredom: Toward an Empirical Approach of Animal Subjectivity, 
PhD. Elinkwijk, Utrecht, 9 1  pp. 
Wemelsfelder, F ., 1 997. Life in captivity: Its lack of opportunities for variable behaviour. Applied Ani­
mal Behaviour Science 54: 67-70. 
Wiepkema, P .R. ,  I 982. On the identity and significance of disturbed behaviour in vertebrates. In: W. 
Bessei (Ed), Disturbed Behaviour in Farm Animals. Hohenheimer Arbeiten 1 2 1 .  Verlag Eugen Ul­
mer, Stuttgart, pp. 7- 17 .  
Wiepkema, P.R., I 987. Behavioural aspects of  stress. I n :  P.R. Wiepkema & P.W.M. van Adrichem 
(Eds), Biology of Stress in Farm Animals: An Integrative Approach. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, pp. 
1 1 3- 133 .  
Wiepkema, P.R. & J.M. Koolhaas, 1 993. Stress and animal welfare. Animal Welfare 2 :  1 95-2 1 8. 
322 Netherlands Journal of Agricultural Science 47 (1999) 
